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David Mayhew’s book Divided We Govern (1991, 2005) has profoundly affected the way 
political scientists not only study but also understand “divided government” in American 
national politics. By analyzing hundreds of congressional statutes enacted during periods of both 
divided and unified government, Mayhew showed that divided government is not as bad as often 
thought. The scholarly response to Mayhew’s book has continued to reshape how divided 
government is perceived and studied by considering the role of other aspects of our political 
system that Mayhew overlooked, such as the formation of party coalitions in times of divided and 
unified government, the recent polarization both within and between the Democratic and 
Republican parties, and the impact of individual actors—particularly the president—on 
legislative productivity. The scholarly literature on divided government can help us to 
understand better the current political impasse in Washington, D.C. where a Democratic 
president and a Republican-controlled Congress battle over rival policy agendas. Is the gridlock 
and limited legislative output the result of divided government, party polarization, or ineffective 
executive and legislative leadership? My project seeks to answer this question by analyzing the 
evolving literature on divided government. 
 
 David Mayhew’s Divided We Govern has profoundly affected the way political scholars 
not only vie divided government but also research. The past six decades of academic study has 
explored the causes of divided government by analyzing political parties, presidents, 
Congressional coalitions, and public mood. However, Mayhew raisied the question of whether 
divided government is really as bad as widely thought. The groundbreaking answer he came to 
through analyzing hundreds of pieces of legislation was a simple ‘no.’ He based his findings on 
the minimal difference in legislative output seen from divided government and unified 
government. He conducted a study of 267 pieces of legislation passed by unified and divided 
governments, in that study he concluded divided and unified governments produce very similar 
amounts of legislation. This suggests something else may be the greater cause of gridlock. The 
scholarly work that resulted from Mayhew’s original work in 1991 has been important in 
changing how divided government is perceived and studied by political scientists. 
  A scholar challenging the accepted belief that divided government was ineffective 
opened the floodgates of perspectives in relation to the phenomenon. Immediately there were 
McIntyre 3 
 
political scientists jumping at their chance to delve further into divided government in the United 
States. Mayhew’s book sparked responses from numerous political scientists. The sheer 
possibility that Mayhew may have been on to something led to a plethora of studies looking at 
different explanations for what divided government really resulted in. Gregory Thorson (1998) 
took Mayhew’s (2005) work one step further and looked beyond the amount of legislation 
produced. Thorson asserted that divided government affects the legislative coalition building 
processes involved in creating policy regardless of the number of policies enacted. Divided 
government can present legislators with uncertainty and lead them to coagulate differently when 
their party is in the majority than in the minority A Democrat in a unified system under 
Democratic control has the power of the party behind him/her and does not need help from 
Republicans to pass legislation. However, in that same instance a Republican must alter his/her 
coalitions in response to being in the minority party (Thorson, 1998). Another study in response 
to Mayhew is Sarah Binder’s (Binder 1999) study that challenges how the political parties 
cooperate within their own party. Rather than challenge how the different political parties 
cooperate, she challenged the political parties themselves and how they cooperate among their 
own in order to produce policy under divided and unified government (Binder 1999). A third 
response to Mayhew’s work comes from a collaboration of scholars. George Edwards III, 
Andrew Barret, and Jeffrey Peake analyze the impact a president can have on the success, and 
failure of policy proposals. They also inspect the presidents’ impact under divided government 
opposed to unified government (Barret, Edwards, and Peake 1997). Lastly, John Coleman 
(Coleman 1999) studies the impact divided government has on party responsiveness to public 
mood. He explores the possibility that although divided government can produce similar 
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amounts of legislation as unified government, it cannot react to the voter as quickly as unified 
government.  
 These four studies mentioned are examples of the impact Mayhew’s work has had on the 
academic community surrounding American government, particularly divided government. It led 
to not only questions being asked that not only introduced new ideas but also forced scholars to 
question whether divided government was good or bad. The mere concept of divided government 
encompasses not only the parties and branches involved but also the individual actors involved. 
Whether it is political parties, presidents, congressional coalitions, or public opinion, scholars are 
asking questions related to divided government. These four different factors effect legislative 
output and do so differently under divided and unified government. Examining the relationships 
between these actors and legislative output can provide insight as to why gridlock occurs and 
under political climate it is most detrimental to policy production. 
 
Divided We Govern- David Mayhew 
David Mayhew, an American political scientist, went against the grain when he 
proclaimed there was little to no difference between a divided government’s ability to forge 
legislation and a unified government’s ability to do so. His book Divided We Govern explores 
the possibility of divided government being equally effective as party government by analyzing 
the amount of significant legislation produced from 1946 to 2002. The 56-year period is broken 
into 28 different Congresses (every two years) by being classified as either divided government 
or unified government. Mayhew defines divided government, perhaps too simply, as both 
political parties having control of either the legislative or executive branch. He then conducts 
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“sweeps” of each Congressional session and identifies the significant legislation from each 
period. Divided We Govern tests conventional wisdom and studies that believed party 
government (unified government) was the most effective means of passing legislation.  
 In order to analyze Mayhew’s work with regard to the legislation passed, it is critical to 
understand what he classifies as significant legislation. He combs through all the significant laws 
passed by Congress throughout the 56-year period with what is referred to as two “sweeps.” The 
first sweep is done by examining journalists’ annual end-of-session wrap-up stories written in the 
New York Times and Washington Post (Mayhew 2005, 37). These pieces thoroughly studied each 
Congress’s effectiveness and covered pieces of legislation by analyzing these well written probes 
of each Congress. Mayhew was able to determine which laws passed by Congress were worthy 
of being labelled significant and ultimately included in his study. This first sweep (Sweep One) 
essentially targeted what legislation the average person thought to be important (Mayhew 2005, 
40). Sweep two took a different approach when determining what was considered to be 
significant legislation. Mayhew relied on retrospective evaluations of policy experts in relation to 
the actual effectiveness of legislation. “By drawing on the long-term perspectives of policy 
specialists about what enactments have counted most in their areas, it adds a dimension of 
expertise…. It pursues the effects of laws, not the promise attached to them when they were 
passed” (Mayhew 2005, 44). This “sweep” relies on the political scientists. Finally, Mayhew 
blends the two “sweeps” results together by using the acts that appear in both “sweeps”, as well 
as other acts he considers to be significant. This produces a list of 267 acts passed by Congress 
from 1946 to 2002 that were either significant in the eyes of the public, experts, or both. 
 Mayhew’s findings are significant because they raise numerous questions about our 
system of government, political parties, and divided government. If anything can be taken from 
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Mayhew’s work it is this: divided government and unified government have both proven to be 
effective means of producing policy as well as ineffective means of producing policy. While the 
sheer number of acts and policies produced is surprisingly similar, there are a number of other 
points pertaining to unified and party government that Mayhew raises. The first is how divided 
government is capable of passing equal numbers of legislation compared with unified 
government. “If all 267 laws are counted equally, the nine “unified” two-year segments average 
12.8 acts, the thirteen “divided” segments average 11.7” (Mayhew 2005, 76). While the average 
over the 56-year period is similar, the ebb and flow of policy production over the 56-year period 
varies greatly in relation to who was president. It is difficult to understand how one presidential 
time period could average 7.8 pieces of legislation per session in Congress, while another is 
capable of averaging 18.5 pieces of legislation (Mayhew 2005, 76). Not only do these numbers 
fluctuate frequently throughout the years but divided government has little relation to these 
averages. Analyzing the effects of other actors, such as political parties, particular presidents and 
Congressional leaders, and public opinion, will help grasp the legislative process and what 
affects it. Understanding that a president must cooperate with not only Congress, but also the 
dynamics of political parties. 
 Mayhew delves into this question substantially in Divided We Govern. He attacks the 
influence of certain policy areas, how the parties can affect their respective members in 
Congress, ideology, public opinion, and societal issues. All of these aspects modify how policy is 
produced but some may have more of an impact on policy production than one would think. 
First, the remarkable effect a policy agenda can have on an administration and Congress’s ability 
to create legislation cannot be understated. Regardless of the parties, president, or anything else, 
a good agenda that everyone can get behind is a simple way to generate popularity and support. 
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Combining this with a time period that is open to change (such as Johnson’s Great Society in the 
1960s) as well as a leader capable of inspiring people, legislation will flow regardless of party or 
divided government. Beyond a workable agenda that avoids controversy and partisan splits, a 
true leader can also spur legislation. Regan was proof of this in the 1980s when he led an 
economic revolution. “Very few Presidents can claim legislative triumphs that are truly turning 
points in domestic policy… Ronald Reagan could claim such a breakthrough in 1981. Like 
Johnson, but unlike Truman or Kennedy, Reagan won the major legislation he asked for” 
(Mayhew 2005, 93). This is another instance in which there is a conundrum pertaining to divided 
and unified government; two presidents working with unified government (Truman and 
Kennedy) failed to reach their lofty goals, but two presidents (Johnson and Reagan) were able to 
side-step the alleged impediment of divided government. Attributing the victories solely up the 
Johnson and Reagan administrations would be a hasty mistake. They were attacking different 
issues at different time periods with different types of parties controlling Congress. Reagan 
enjoyed the luxury of having a cluster of Democrats in Congress more than willing to aid his 
proposals’ passage. Kennedy and Truman perhaps paved the way for Johnson’s success by 
initiating the fight for civil rights, education, and environmental programs by battling their 
Democratic Congress throughout their terms. The point is that it is too simple to declare divided 
government good or bad. It is a complex thing that can be fueled or derailed by parties, 
prominent leaders, or workable policy that is simply less controversial. While Mayhew’s work is 
profound, it raises questions about how our government interacts among the different branches 
and agencies as well as in relation to party lines.  
 The way the Democratic and Republican Parties interact is crucial to analyzing divided 
and unified government. How does a unified government produce significantly less legislation 
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than a divided government? After all, they are a part of the same organization and identify with 
the same political party. The issue may lie within each respective party and its ideology. For 
example, the Southern Democrats’ defection because of the Civil Rights movement during the 
Truman and Kennedy administrations hurt the progress of the Democratic Party as a unit. This is 
an example of division within the party that can be seen in present day politics. The ideological 
splits within the parties themselves can be more detrimental than anything else. Whether it is the 
Tea Party polarizing the Republican Party or ultra-liberal Democrats doing the same, a polarized 
party that cannot work together will simply cripple itself throughout the primary elections or on 
the floor of Congress as the Southern Democrats did for so long. Mayhew showed at least one 
thing: divided government is perhaps the least of our problems. Identifying the true factors that 
cause our government to shut down and also what creates legislation is imperative to creating a 
system that can work. Whether that means finding people with the passion and charisma required 
to pull the two polarized parties together, crafting a workable agenda that moves policy in a 
direction, or simply identifying issues in society and generating public support, is yet to be 
determined. By studying other scholars work related to the president, Congressional coalitions, 
party polarization, and public mood, we can learn what really affects legislative output. Yes, 
Mayhew has established that divided government and unified government produce similar 
amounts of legislation, but I want to know why. There are other factors affecting legislative 
output to varying extents at different points in time. Deciphering the most influential can help 
voters—as well as everyone involved—understand the nuances of divided and unified 
government. This, in turn, can lead to appreciating legislative successes and recognizing there 
are multiple actors responsible for the lack of policy production.   
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First, we must address why these scholars were chosen when there are plenty of works 
out there in response to David Mayhew’s Divided We Govern. The current state of American 
government and the public perception of its purpose in recent years influenced the choice of 
articles. They all relate to each other in one way or another: the president, Congress, and political 
parties are interrelated. To the average citizen who watching the nightly news, there is simply a 
dysfunctional government whose parts cannot cooperate with one another. However, these 
scholars highlight the biggest issue with public perception; many citizens are naïve, uninformed, 
and do not understand the structure of their very own government. Some presidents have worked 
with their opponents, while others did not. Still, a president who can work with an opposition 
party may face a Congress unwilling to approve legislation it does not fully agree with. Congress 
and the president are both capable of single handedly stalling agendas and legislation regardless 
of how effective their opposition is. Additionally, the make-up of the political parties can change 
the dynamic of both institutions. A party willing to cooperate with the other undoubtedly affects 
how effectively policy can be produced, but what if the parties cannot cooperate internally? Party 
polarization is rampant in today’s political environment and greatly affects how all these moving 
parts work before divided government is even considered. The scholarly articles reviewed here 
examine the interactions of all these working parts and effectively consider other options and 
possibilities while testing their hypotheses. 
  
Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock 
 A particular scholar’s response to David Mayhew’s work was done by Sarah A. Binder. 
She examines the relationship among intra-branch conflict, party polarization, and policy 
stalemate. Like Mayhew, she used the New York Times to decipher a list of issues pertaining to 
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each two-year Congressional period from 1947 to 1996. She then determined the number of 
times the issue was mentioned in New York Times editorials along with the ultimate fate of the 
issue. Lastly, she calculated the gridlock score by determining the number of issues on the 
agenda for an administration and whether it was resolved. Her findings were mixed but 
significant. She shows that divided government does induce more gridlock within the national 
government, but she also recognizes divided government can still produce similar amounts of 
legislation (Binder 1999, 527). Furthermore, she looks into the issue of partisan polarization and 
ideological diversity.  
  
 
 
Despite the faith of responsible party advocates in cohesive political parties, the results 
here suggest that policy change is less likely as the parties become more polarized and 
the percentage of moderate legislators shrinks. Clearly, there are limits to the power of 
political parties to break policy deadlock. Indeed, it appears that intense polarization can 
be counterproductive to fostering policy change. (Binder 1999, 527)  
 
While it is easy to simply blame either the Democrats or Republicans for gridlock, the situation 
is much more complicated than that. Party polarization forces Democrats and Republicans to 
respond appropriately in order to remain in office. This could mean going further left, right, or 
center depending upon their political climate. The fact is that splintering among the parties and 
the party ideologies are detrimental to a government’s ability to produce policy legislation. For 
example Reagan was able to navigate numerous pieces of significant legislation through divided 
government due to the support he received from Southern Democrats while other presidents 
could not pass a note to the Speaker with unified government. This raises the question of what 
truly is the problem with our government and its tendency to breed gridlock. Ideological 
differences are obviously culprits as well because that is the basis of all policy disagreements, 
but they manifest themselves differently. Ideological differences can surface through the voter, 
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parties, candidates, branches, and other political factors. Which of these factors is the most 
influential when affecting policy production, and does it have anything to do with divided 
government? Binder and Thorson both raised points in relation to interactions among 
government branches and actors. Thorson analyzed coalitions between the political parties. 
Binder researched the political parties and the polarization of ideologies. Both came to valid 
conclusions that coincide with Mayhew’s thesis pertaining to divided government, but they 
expanded upon the notions of divided government and gridlock.  
 
Divided Government’s Effect on the Formation of Congressional Coalitions  
Mayhew’s Divided We Govern has provoked multiple studies seeking to challenge or 
support his thesis. Thorson challenges not the specific number of policies enacted but rather the 
content of those policies being altered due to either unified or divided government. The 
legislative coalition-building Thorson is concerned with is important not only to how different 
actors in the legislative process interact but also to how policy is created and passed. The real 
concern is not the amount of legislation passed but rather ow divided government can affect 
coalition-building is significant. Thorson argues that “during divided government, members will 
be uncertain as to the coalitions that will form on the passage of significant legislation, and this 
uncertainty will lead them to accept the suboptimal payoffs” (Thorson 1998, 756). Thorson tests 
whether unified government increases the likelihood of partisan coalitions, as opposed to 
bipartisan, forming on the final passage vote for significant legislation. Thorson also argues that 
divided government leads Democratic and Republican Party members to settle when bargaining 
with each other because of the uncertainty divided government brings to the legislative process 
(Thorson 1998, 756). The results showed that in both houses of Congress it is more likely that 
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the parties will stick together. He shows this by calculating the proportion of significant 
legislation passed in both houses with party unity votes (majority of the dominant party favored 
and majority of minority party opposed). While his results are undoubtedly significant in 
showing the effect divided government has on our legislative system, it is yet to be determined 
whether divided government or unified government is preferred, and how significantly the two 
affect the legislative process. 
 Achieving a party unity vote is telling of the state of the parties. If the majority and 
minority are willing to stick together, then the polarization within the parties themselves should 
be relatively low and the policies produced will be more partisan than not. This raises the 
question of whether his is desirable for government. In Washington D.C. there is a substantial 
amount of separation not only between the Democratic and Republican parties but also within 
the parties. While Thorson raises a significant point in relation to how Mayhew’s work misses a 
key factor in producing legislation (coalitions, political parties, public perception), he analysis is 
incomplete. Party loyalty fluctuates throughout the decades Mayhew is analyzing. There are 
times in when unified government was capable of producing significant legislation and times 
divided government was as well. However, there were also times when neither unified nor 
divided government could pass any type of legislation, let alone significant legislation. During 
all of these periods parties ranged from polarized to centrist; and while Thorson’s work shows 
there is a tendency for unified government to lead to party loyalty and more party unity votes, 
neither of those factors has definitively been shown to increase the production of significant 
legislation they just give one party more influence. 
Party Responsiveness to Public Mood 
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 Another scholarly point of view questions whether divided or unified government is more 
responsive to public mood and opinion. John J. Coleman combines the work of Mayhew and 
political scientists George Edwards, Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake in order to formulate a 
list of significant legislation. Coleman then splits the same time period Mayhew used       
(1946—1992) into either unified Democratic, unified Republican, divided Democratic, or 
divided Republican. Additionally, Coleman explores the possibility of legislation proposed 
during divided government being more likely to pass during a period of unified government in 
the future. “Another sign that unified government solves the problems that divided government 
leaves behind would be the adoption during unified government of important enactments that 
stalled during divided government” (Coleman 1999, 828).  This is a legitimate objection to 
Mayhew’s work that examines failed agendas initiated during divided government and the 
possibility they are more likely to be successful during unified government. Therefore a 
Democratic agenda will fare better during a time of Democratic unified government perhaps two 
terms down the road, as opposed to a divided period. While Coleman finds no significant 
evidence to suggest this is a statistically valid point (Coleman 1999, 828), it is logical. Moreover, 
Coleman’s work extends to party responsiveness and the parties’ abilities to handle different 
types of government.  
 The last part of Coleman’s study seeks to determine which party is better 
equipped to handle different types of government. However, the issue concerns which 
type of government allows parties to respond as quickly to public opinion. The last point 
he raises relates to party responsiveness to public mood. Coleman measures party 
responsiveness by examining the amount of legislation a party is able to pass during 
unified government, as opposed to the average number of enactments passed during 
McIntyre 14 
 
divided government. “During unified governments, by contrast, they lead to the adoption 
of from three to five more significant enactments, produce nine fewer failed pieces of 
legislation, and boost the percentage of successful legislation by 23 points compared to 
non-supermajoritarian government” (Coleman 1999, 832). This point considers the 
structural advantages that unified government offers and the challenge that divided 
government presents. When a party is able to control the executive branch, Senate, and 
House of Representatives, it is able to streamline the legislative process—assuming the 
party itself is unified—and pass legislation rapidly. While this is effective and shows 
unified government in a positive light, it is a skewed perspective. It operates under the 
assumption that the political party is unified. If the party is united then legislation can be 
forged efficiently. However, unified government can also fall apart. Without strong and 
unified leadership in Congress and the presidency this method of governance can 
struggle. It can be an effective system so long as it is accompanied by certain variables. Is 
it truly the structure of Congress that accelerates unified government’s production of 
legislation and aids the party in power? Or is it the Democratic and Republican parties’ 
ability (or inability) to get along with one another? Furthermore, is it a strong leader’s 
ability to unify their party toward one common goal? There are multiple questions raised 
by this study that question Mayhew’s thesis and conclusion. 
 
The Impact of the President on Legislative Productivity 
Several scholars differ from Mayhew in their approach to divided government and its 
effect on legislative production. Opposed to Mayhew’s categorizing of legislation that passed 
from 1946 to 2002, Barret, Edwards III, and Peake examine the policy proposals that failed 
McIntyre 15 
 
throughout periods of divided and unified government. They hypothesize that divided 
government allows members who oppose the president’s party ample opportunity to create 
gridlock, and vice versa (Barret, Edwards, and Peake 1997, 547). They used Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac to document policy proposals that failed and they also discover why they 
failed. Their research established several points. 
Presidents oppose significant legislation more often under divided government, and much 
more seriously considered, important legislation fails to pass under divided government 
than under unified government. Furthermore, the odds of such legislation failing to pass 
are considerably greater under divided government. The pre-Mayhew conventional 
wisdom was correct: divided government inhibits the passage of important legislation. 
(Barret, Edwards, and Peake 1997, 562)  
 
They focus on how a president perceives legislation. Their results show that the president is 25% 
more likely to oppose legislation produced by Congress during divided government than unified 
government. They specifically cite the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as well as the 
Reagan administration in order to magnify the differences in policy opposition (Barret, Edwards, 
and Peake 1997, 556). Furthermore, there is little difference in the number of bills that failed to 
pass during divided government and unified government when they are supported by the 
president (Barret, Edwards, and Peake 1997, 559). This is an interesting point because it suggests 
that the presidents’ influence is greater when it comes to legislation they oppose compared with 
legislation they support. The Democratic activism and the members’ willingness to support 
Republican presidents may have something to do with this, but it could also simply be there are 
some presidents better than others in their ability to negotiate and attract bipartisan support.  
The last significant point brought about by this study is the relationship between 
presidents opposing bills and the fate of those bills, regardless of unified or divided government.  
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We find that presidents succeed in blocking 94% of the legislation they oppose under 
divided government and 92% under unified government. In addition, there is a 52% 
failure rate of legislation the president supports under divided government and a similar 
54% rate under unified government. (Barret, Edwards, and Peake 1997, 562) 
 
This last point is perhaps the most interesting because it suggests the president’s influence is the 
same regardless of type of government. The amount of legislation passed is similar whether 
government is divided or unified, as Mayhew has shown, and there is also little difference in the 
amount of legislation being passed and blocked. Divided government’s unclear effects on policy 
production raise questions elsewhere. Is enacting legislation a function of presidential leadership, 
the political parties abilities to cooperate, or perhaps sheer willingness of the actors involved to 
move legislation along?  
 
So What? 
 David Mayhew’s Divided We Govern has been the catalyst of multiple works pertaining 
to divided government, and it has transformed the way divided government is studied. Divided 
government has been shown to affect policy positively as well as negatively. However, the 
timely and efficient enactment of policy is also affected by other factors including the formation 
of party coalitions, polarization of the Democratic and Republican parties, party responsiveness, 
and the individual actors who make up the federal government (particularly the president). 
Analyzing these four contributors to policy enactment can help us to understand the political 
turmoil seen in Washington, D.C. today. Is the ongoing gridlock a result of divided government, 
party coalitions, party polarization, party responsiveness, individual actors, or a combination of 
these factors?    
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 Divided and unified government are comparable in terms of the number of policies 
enacted, but that does not mean that parties function in the same manner under different 
conditions. The polarization of parties can also be related to the specific time periods that 
Mayhew and other scholars examine, particularly the presidential term of Ronald Reagan. 
Reagan, a Republican, faced a Democratic Congress for half of his presidency, yet some people 
consider him to be one of the best presidents of the last fifty years. What was it about this time 
period that allowed Congress and the president to work so well together, while today’s Congress 
and president rarely cooperate?  A possible explanation is the stark difference between the 
political parties of the 1980s and those of today. Reagan enjoyed the support of Democrats, 
which allowed him to convince enough Democrats in Congress to support his agenda. Today’s 
political atmosphere breeds political combat via media outlets, so it is impossible to envision a 
large number of partisans from either side coming together on a crucial vote. Not only would 
doing so be political suicide, but nobody seems even to want to. Substituting Reagan’s moderate 
Congress with today’s polarized Congress would create an interesting scenario and it could help 
answer questions about divided government. If Reagan—an effective president—failed to 
generate legislation with a polarized Congress, then perhaps the greater influence on policy 
production is not divided government but party polarization. However, if Reagan still managed 
to produce legislation at a similar rate, then a leader with better political skills may be more 
important to legislative productivity. There is no clear answer resulting from either outcome 
simply because of the complexity of the political system. It would be easy to declare Reagan the 
best and credit him with the success of that period, but doing so would be unjust to other actors 
in the political system.  
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 This hypothetical is not meant to produce answers but only observations pertaining to the 
current state of affairs in Washington, D.C. Barack Obama is facing not only a Congress that is 
divided against him but also parties that are divided internally. Which of these factors is more 
influential on legislative output? The Democratic and Republican parties seem to be in a constant 
battle, slowing down the legislative process. In his response to Divided We Govern, Thorson 
tests the likelihood of party voting (Thorson 1998).  
During divided government, just over 8 percent of significant legislation passed during 
divided government with a party unity vote favoring the dominant party. The percentage 
increases to over 16 percent when the dominant party controls both the House and 
presidency but does not have enough members to obtain cloture in the Senate. It increases 
to nearly 30 percent when the dominant party does have enough members to obtain 
cloture. (Thorson 1998, 758) 
By this logic, divided government means that parties are likely to face greater internal party 
polarization; the more unified the government, the less internal party conflict. Conversely, the 
most unified form of government—capable of winning a cloture vote in the Senate—passes 22% 
more significant legislation tham divided government. This analysis stretches the definition of 
party unity vote but it is sensible. A party that can round up more than half of its members to 
oppose half of the other party’s members should be considered undivided. Thus divided 
government and unified government differ; unified government produces partisan coalitions that 
stick together and pass significant legislation, while divided government seemingly does the 
opposite. So is the key to legislative productivity party cooperation, a skilled president, the 
parties getting along internally, or is it a combination of all of these factors? Government 
functioning as it did during the Reagan era is similar to building the perfect team. The era had 
the perfect combination of political parties willing to interact with one another, a leader capable 
of uniting both fronts, and parties unified internally.  
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All these factors are helpful when passing legislative agendas and lacking just one of 
them complicates the entire process. For example, in order for President Obama to be able to 
appeal to Republicans, he must know what they desire. In order to tell President Obama what 
they desire, Republicans must first know what they want. Currently, there are about twenty 
different views coming from twenty different candidates for the Democratic and Republican 
presidential nominations. As divided as a party can be, Republicans are struggling to find an 
identity—this problem affects Democrats as well—and they therefore are struggling to identify 
with voters. This disconnects the party and the people as well as party leaders from party 
loyalists in Congress. This is detrimental to the president’s ability to cooperate across party lines 
and to formulate any type of bipartisan policy whether under divided or unified government. 
Good communication and clarity when articulating a party’s vision for the country is just as 
important as putting forth a quality candidate to run for president. One without the other 
magnifies weaknesses and leaves our system of government gridlocked, confused, and frustrated.  
A skilled and charismatic leader can attract votes and attention from all sides. Good 
presidents like Reagan and Johnson overcame political turmoil and hardship in order to achieve 
their agendas. Reagan faced divided government and Johnson faced unified government, and 
both provided us with two of the best presidential administrations in terms of legislative output. 
One divided, one unified. One polarized, one not so polarized. One with strong parties, one with 
weak parties. There seems to be no apparent rhyme or reason for these presidencies being so 
effective and no common denominator. Parties have shown their power in determining how 
operational policy will be, through internal or external conflict. Whether there is divided 
government or not does not seem to matter, nor does the strength of the parties. So what explains 
the differences? Strong presidential leadership can unify as well as divide a government. If 
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he/she can make the deals and decisions to bring all of the moving parts together successfully, 
then yes, a president can help spur legislation. On the other hand, a key variable could be the 
presence of a time period with little confrontation because of a widely popular agenda. Other 
times it could be extremely controversial issues—as seen in today’s society—with the president 
and Congressional leaders fighting viciously. In that case where does the blame fall? Every time 
period is unique, but can the leaders of the government find a way to make it work? If they can 
succeed at negotiating with different actors with different perspectives, good leaders can help the 
system adapt and enact significant policy effectively.  
President Obama and congressional leaders are often criticized for being ineffective 
politicians who do not get anything done. This can be seen with the Republicans’ general 
reluctance to accept anything said or done by Democrats, and in general with the polarization 
within the public. This situation has several consequences. First is the effect of public perception 
and how the government responds to it. Unified government—as Coleman (Coleman 1999) 
demonstrated—produces more significant legislation and less failed legislation, and it raises the 
chances of passing significant legislation nearly 25%. This suggests that the party controlling 
unified government is more equipped to respond to its supporters. However, divided government 
can also produce similar amounts of legislation and perhaps a similar ability to respond to public 
mood. Public mood and perception are not the cure for divided government, but they do 
contribute to a solution. There are times when the public mood is rather passive and willing to 
compromise. Then there are times when the public mood is enraged with the current political 
situation and demands change. Both of these situations can come about during divided or unified 
government very easily. There is good unified government and bad unified government, just as 
there is good divided government and bad divided government. Which situation prevails is 
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related to whether the parties are polarized and the current state of the public. Polarized parties 
fed by emotional supporters are not likely to cooperate, but moderate parties with stable 
supporters may. Unified government that is controlled by a party with no real direction and 
factions within is just as dangerous to legislative productivity as divided government controlled 
by two polarized parties. There is give-and-take with both forms of government, and there are a 
plethora of factors contributing to whether policies are enacted.  
By being obstructionist, any one of the players mentioned thus far can block the entire 
process. If the block is a result of public mood and perception being intensified, then it may be a 
time period of status quo or a sign that the country is simply in disagreement and not ready to 
progress on those specific matters. This last point is undervalued because it is difficult to 
quantify. The 21st century has brought boundless amounts of technology, new beliefs, and some 
of the most controversial issues our country has ever faced. The racial, gender, sexual, political, 
and economic divides are boundless. Coming to any sort of agreement on just one of those 
matters is difficult; doing so on all of them is impossible. It is not an accident that Obamacare is 
being fought till the end by the Republicans, or that same-sex marriage has produced such 
backlash and controversy. A significant portion of the population opposes change, accepting 
other people, and aiding other people because they were raised to chase the American dream and 
to work hard for their own. There is also a significant portion of the country generously willing 
to lend hands to others and to accept them because that is how they were raised. Today we reside 
in an America that is transitioning from the one dominated by the Baby Boomers to an America 
that truly does attempt to grant equality to all citizens regardless of their differences. This 
transition is not quick nor can it be forced. The divide extends to Congress and the president and 
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undeniably adds to the cumbersome policy production and negative impressions of the 
government’s leaders.  
In this project I have come to realize there is no right or wrong answer to how divided 
government affects policy legislation. That is because it involves too many other moving parts in 
the government. Divided government has exhibited the capacity to polarize parties at times—as 
seen in today’s political environment—or help bring parties together to formulate bipartisan 
policy. However, unified government too has shown it can lead parties to polarization or 
convergence. This suggests that while divided government can certainly affect how parties react, 
it may simply just push them in one direction or another rather than dictate the outcome. That is, 
divided government seems likely to increase the split between them. The constant battle may 
either push them further apart or encourage them to work together to create bipartisan legislation. 
This analysis is applicable to the political climate in Washington, D.C. today where a divided 
government breeds constant controversy. Is this what creates the political impediments—
polarized parties magnified by divided government—or could it also be the lack of leadership 
seen in Congress and the presidency? Speaker of the House John Boehner, House Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell, and President Obama have stark battles within their parties as well as 
with the opposition party. At what point are the leaders responsible for taming their and at what 
point are they rendered helpless? Party zealots must be removed by the voters. Putting these 
extremists in power and allowing them to pull the parties apart hurts everyone. It negates a 
leader’s ability to communicate with the other side effectively, polarizes the parties between 
themselves, and divides the Democratic and Republican parties internally. Every government is 
unique in how it is built and every one requires different approaches from the actors involved in 
order to create legislation. It may require a leader that can bring the parties together, or parties 
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that bring leaders together. It may require parties willing to cooperate while facing a public mood 
that simply is not on board with the agenda. Our government is fashioned to force different 
branches and players to work together either by design (unified), or to clash in order to create 
legislation most representative of the population. The true challenge is finding the right people 
and members that can make this work regardless of the structural blockades. The best legislative 
periods simply made the situation at hand work and produced significant legislation regardless of 
the presence or absence of divided government. 
Conclusion 
 David Mayhew helped spur scholarly work pertaining to divided government when he 
wrote Divided We Govern. The responding works challenge and qualify his book in a multitude 
of ways, each asking different questions and coming to different conclusions. After analyzing 
Thorson (1998), Binder (1999), Barrett, Edwards, and Peake (1997), and Coleman (1999) it is 
safe to say divided government is no simple concept. The numerous factors affecting policy 
production muddy the waters when examining divided government. The true difficulty in 
studying divided government is being able to separate all of the different factors from one 
another. If party polarization, legislative coalitions, the president, and public mood could all be 
studied in a vacuum, a clearer picture of divided government’s impact could be drawn. Instead, 
scholars must weigh the influence of these actors in relation to divided government’s affect and 
then draw conclusions. This leads to opinions and hypotheses relating to divided government but 
little hard evidence. Our system of government is more complex than we can fathom. Because 
each administration encounters new obstacles—whether it be a polarized opposition party, a 
president unwilling to compromise, or sensitive matters of public opinion—the government will 
have to adapt in order to produce legislation. Finding the right combination of working with and 
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against other political parties and branches of government cannot be done with the same formula 
every four years; each term presents different oppositions in different forms. Identifying a 
method for studying the various factors independently affecting legislative output independently 
can lead to a solution to gridlock in the United States. 
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